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THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT V. THE CLIFFORD REGULATIONS:
"DUE PROCESS" EMANCIPATES THE TAX AVOIDER*
TRUSTS are a favorite income-splitting device among taxpayers seeking to
avoid the high federal tax rates on large incomes.' While the settlor hopes
the Government will tax the income of his trust separately, he is generally
reluctant to relinquish all control over, or benefit from, the trust. But by
retaining such attributes of ownership, the settlor may defeat his own tax
avoidance scheme. The Supreme Court holds him taxable on trust income
used to discharge his legal obligations.2 And by statute, the settlor is taxed
on trust income when he, or someone without an interest substantially ad-
*Commissioner v. Clark, Commissioner v. Rutherford, 202 F.2d 94 (7th Cir. 1953).
The Government has decided not to petition for certiorari. 4 P-H 1953 FED. TAX SMV.
71,096.
1. "By the creation of trusts, incomes had been so divided and subdivided as to
withdraw from the Government the benefit of the graduated taxes and surtaxes applicable
to income when concentrated in a single ownership. . . . One can read in the revisions
of the revenue acts the record of the Government's endeavor to keep pace with the fer-
tility of invention whereby taxpayers had contrived to keep the larger benefits of owner-
ship and be relieved of the attendant burdens." Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670, 675-6
(1933). See also H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1924) ; SEN. REP. No. 398,
68th Cong., 1st Sess. 25-6 (1924). One aim of the recently added provision permitting
spouses to file joint returns, INT. REv. CoDE § 51(b), was to reduce the incentive to set
up tax-avoiding trusts. H.R. REP. No. 1274, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1948). But this
only permits a taxpayer to split his income in half. The trust device permits splitting
into many parts. See Funk v. Commissioner, 185 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1950).
For diverse views on the legitimacy of the trust as a hiding place in the perennial
hide-and-seek game in which the tax collector is always "it," see Caplin, Protecting a
Grantor of a Short-Term Trust Against Income Taxation, 18 TAXEs 677 (1940); Ken-
nedy, Short-Term Trusts Today, 30 TAXES 1006 (1952) ; Note, 60 YALE L.J. 1426 (1951).
2. Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1 (1935) (alimony payments); Helvering v.
Schweitzer, 296 U.S. 551 (1935) (support of minor children). See Paul, Five Years
with Douglas v. Willcuts, 53 HAv. L. REv. 1 (1939); Note, 52 HARv. L. REv. 804
(1939). See also Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154 (1942), 52 YALE L.J. 662 (1943);
Guterman, The Federal Income Tax and Trusts for Support-The Stuart Case and Its
Aftermath, 57 HAav. L. REv. 479 (1944).
When the obligation is completely discharged by the initial transfer of the property,
however, subsequent income from that property is no longer taxable to the obligor.
Pearce v. Commissioner, 315 U.S. 543 (1942) (income from annuity for divorced wife).
When there are no other grounds to support taxation, a settlor is taxable on trust income
only to the extent it is actually applied to discharge the obligation. INT. REV. CODE §
167(c). By statute, income from alimony trusts is now included in the wife's gross income.
INT. REv. CODE § 171.
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verse to his, can revest either the corpus 3 or the income 4 in the settlor or
use the income to pay insurance premiums on his life." In the controversial
Clifford case the Supreme Court attributed the income of a five-year irrevoc-
able trust to the settlor under Section 22(a) of the Internal Revenue Code,
which defines "gross income." The Court held that the settlor "continued
to be the owner" of the corpus for income tax purposes because no "substan-
tial change" had occurred in his "dominion and control." 7 The circumstances
which "all [led] irresistibly" to this conclusion were "the short duration of
the trust, the fact that the [settlor's] wife was the beneficiary, and the reten-
tion of control over the corpus." s But since the Court stated that "no one fact
is normally decisive," the tax status of short-term irrevocable trusts lacking
one or more of the Clifford factors remained uncertain.
3. IxT. REv. CODE § 166, Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930); Reinecze v. Smith,
289 U.S. 172 (1933). Originally, the settlor was taxed only when he could revoke the
trust "during the taxable year." Revenue Act of 1924, § 219(g), 43 ST,\T. 277 (1924).
Taxpayers avoided this provision simply by suspending their right to revulze fur a year
and a day. E.g., Langley v. Commissioner, 61 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1932)L To prevent such
evasion, Congress deleted the phrase "during the taxable year." Revenue Act of 1934,
§ 166, 48 STAT. 729 (1934). Section 166 applies only to "vested" pox. ers of revocati,',
not to contingent rights. Commissioner v. Petts, 123 F.2d 534 7th Cir. 1941); Co'rning
v. Commissioner, 104 F.2d 329 (6th Cir. 1939). Presumably a settlor w'ould not 1-e
taxable for retaining even a "vested' power when it could not be exercised until sone
remote date. See Helvering v. Dunning, 118 F2d 341, 345 (4th Cir.), cert. dened,
314 U.S. 631 (1941).
Since the Clifford decision, note 7 inlra. § 166 has declined in importance. Curts have
taxed the income of revocable trusts to settlors under § 221(a). E.g., White v. Higgins,
116 F2d 312 (1st Cir. 1940); Cox v. Commissiner, 110 F.2d 934 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 311 U.S. 667 (1940). But a settlor-reversioner of an irrevocable trust is not tax-
able under § 166. Helvering v. Wood, 309 U.S. 344 (1940).
See, generally, KENxEDY, FEicr..%L I.Ncomx TA*ATIwNz o" TRI-STS AND ESTATES §§
6.05-6.13 (1948); PAUL, STUDIE-S IN FFD-A\L TAXATIzo, Tmnn SEMEs 165-223 (1940);
Ray, The Income Tax on Short Term and Rcvocable Trusts, 53 H.,v. L. Rn;'. 1322,
1322-41 (1940).
4. IN-T. REv. CoD § 167(a) (1), 167(a) (2), Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930);
Altmaier v. Commissioner, 116 F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 705
(1941). These sections, like § 166, note 3 supra, have also been eclipsed by Clifford,
since a court can now rely on § 22(a). E.g., First Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Commissioner,
110 F2d 448 (7th Cir. 1940). See, generally, Kx-:4uy, op. cit. supra note 3, §§ 6.14-6.18.
5. I-r. REv. CODE § 167(a) (3), Burnct v. Wells, 29 U.S. 670 (1933). See Kn: :xt ,
op. cit. supra note 3, § 6.19; Comment, 44 Y.xi.n L.J. 1409, 1409-15 (1935).
6. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940), 49 YAL- LJ. 1305. See also PAUL,
op. cit. supra note 3, passim; Ray, supra note 3, at 1348-57.
Clifford recognizes the validity of the trust for non-tax purposes. Helvering v. Clifford,
supra at 335. There were some pre-Clifford cases taxing settlors under § 22(a) on the
theory that the trust was a complete sham. E.g., DuPont v. Commissioner, 289 U.S. 65
(1933) (insurance trust; even the dissenters in Wtells, supra note 5, joined the majority
on this ground). See Ray, supra note 3, at 1341-S.
7. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 335 (1940).
S. Ibid.
9. Id. at 336. But see text at note 51 infra.
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Amid the flood of inconsistent lower court decisions spawned by Clifford,10
some authority can be found for taxing trust income to settlors with reversion-
ary interests on the ground that the trust term is short. The Second Circuit
suggested that in such a case there need be "no express reservations of con-
trol" "because the grantor will soon reacquire complete dominion .... 1"n But
there was little agreement as to how short the term had to be. 12 Some courts
attempted to confine the Clifford doctrine to cases, like Clifford itself, in which
the trust benefited only the taxpayer's "intimate family group" ;13 but they
had difficulty delimiting that class.' 4 The circuits also split over the applica-
bility of the doctrine to charitable trusts.15 In short, the decisions provide
authority both for and against almost any conceivable rule of thumb.
10. See Kohnstamm v. Pedrick, 153 F.2d 506, 510 (2d Cir. 1945) ; Hyman v. Nunan,
143 F.2d 425, 427 (2d Cir. 1944). See Magill, What Shall Be Done with the Clifford
Case?, 45 Cot. L. REv. 111 (1945) ; Polisher, The Family Trust-Its Income Tax Fate,
49 DicK. L. Rsv. 33 (1945) ; Notes, 31 Go. L.J. 477 (1943), 10 U. or CHI. L. Ray. 488
(1943).
11. Commissioner v. Buck, 120 F.2d 775, 778 (2d Cir. 1941). See Cushman v. Com-
missioner, 153 F.2d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 1946); Commissioner v. Katz, 139 F.2d 107, 109
(7th Cir. 1943) ; Helvering v. Elias, 122 F.2d 171, 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S.
692 (1941). But cf. Central Nat. Bank of Cleveland v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 352, 354
(6th Cir. 1944).
12. Taxable: Helvering v. Elias, 122 F.2d 171 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 692
(1941) (6Y 2-year term); cf. Commissioner v. O'Keeffe, 118 F.2d 639 (1st Cir. 1941)
(15-year term; settlor one of four trustees). Nontaxable: Central Nat. Bank of Cleveland
v. Commisioner, 141 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1944) (7-year term) ; Commisioner v. Jonas, 122
F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1941) (10-year term). See also cases cited, infra notes 13, 15.
Since the cases usually involve additional factors, such as the identity of the bene-
ficiaries and retention of administrative control over the corpus, the decisions do not
provide inescapable authority for taxing on the shortness of the trust term alone. The
above cited decisions, however, come as close as possible to isolating the short-term
factor.
13. When the beneficiaries fell outside the family group, these courts did not tax
the settlor. Helvering v. Bok, 132 F.2d 365 (3d Cir. 1942) (3-year trusts for charity
and individuals unrelated to settlor) ; Dunlevy Milbank, 41 B.T.A. 1014 (1940) (3-year
trust for sister-in-law; 5-year, uncle). See Kraft v. Commissioner, 111 F2d 370, 371
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 671 (1940). Cf. Farkas v. Commissioner, 170 F.2d 201
(5th Cir. 1948) (10-year trust for settlor's nieces and nephews; one judge dissented while
a second concurred by analogy to the Clifford regulation, infra note 18). Contra, Leonard
Farkas, 8 T.C. 1351 (1947) (split decision), revd, 170 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1948). But
see Cushman v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 1946).
14. Compare Commissioner v. Barbour, 122 F.2d 165, 167 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
314 U.S. 691 (1941) (mother-in-law living apart; settlor taxed) and Commissioner v.
Woolley, 122 F.2d 167, 169 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 693 (1941) (nephew for
whose education and maintenance settlor had paid regarded as "in the family" though
not member of household) with Central Nat. Bank of Cleveland v. Commissioner, 141
F.2d 352, 355 (6th Cir. 1944) (adult children with own homes; settlor held non-taxable)
and Farkas v. Commissioner, 170 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1948) (nieces and nephews; settlor
held non-taxable).
15. Taxable: United States v. Anderson, 132 F.2d 98 (6th Cir. 19,12), cert. denied,
318 U.S. 790 (1943) (53/-year term); Commissioner v. Lamont, 127 F.2d 875 (2d Cir.
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To dispel this "uncertainty and confusion," the Treasury in 1945 issued
the complex and far-reaching Clifford regulations.1 6 They evoked severe
criticism, largely because they treated each of the factors present collectively in
Clifford as an independently sufficient ground for taxation. 17 Taxing on
shortness of term alone, one of the regulations attributes trust income to a
settlor when the corpus or the income will, or may reasonably be expected to,
revert to him within ten years of the date of transfer.18
In Commissioner v. Clark,' the Seventh Circuit held this "short-term"
regulation unconstitutional. Retaining no express controls, the taxpayer in
1941 deeded securities to a local charitable foundation as trustee and bene-
ficiary for five years.20 A year later, the term was extended to run nine years
from the date of extension.2 1 When the trust income was treated as part of
the settlor's income, it far exceeded the allowable charitable deduction.2 As a
result, the Commissioner assessed deficiencies for 1944, 1945, and 1946, but later
conceded that the settlor was not taxable for the first two years, which were
not covered by the regulation.- A divided Tax Court held that neither the
1942) (1-year term, settlor retained extensive controls); Edwin C. 'May, 3 T.C.M. 733,
740-3 (1944) (long-term, control).
Arontaxable: United States v. Pierce, 137 F.2d 423 (8th Cir. 1943) (10-year term,
split decision); Helvering v. Bok, 132 F.2d 365 (3d Cir. 1942) i3-year term) ; C.m-
missioner v. Chamberlain, 121 F.2d 765 (2d Cir. 1941) (4-year educational trust. See
Helvering v. Achelis, 112 F2d 929, 929-30 (2d Cir. 1940) (5-year educational trut).
Admitting that Chambcrlain and Achelis were distinguishable on their fact-;, the Secon
Circuit nevertheless questioned their validity in the Lantont case, supra at 'T,.
16. U.S. Treas. Reg. 111. § 29.22(a)-21 (1945). See Eisenstein, 7he Clifford Reiula-
lions and the Heavenly City of Legislative Intention. 2 TAx L. REv. 327 ( 1947) ; Gutrman,
The New Clifford Regulations, 1 T.%x L. REv. 379 (1946); Lyiich, The Treasury Inter-
prets the Clifford Case, 15 Ford L. RLv. 161 (1946); Pavenstcdt, The Treasury Legis-
lates: The Distortion of the Clifford Rule, 2 TAx L. RrvX 7 (1946) ; Polisher, The ,cw
Trust Regulations Under the Clifford Doctrine, 24 TAxEs 352 (1946).
17. See KxxED-, FEDMAL INcO-mE TAXATIO.N oF TnusTs AM) EsrT,-,ms § (23
(1948); Lynch, Pavenstedt, supra note 16.
18. U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 2922(a)-21 (c) (1) (1945). Unless the beneficiary is a
charity, the settlor also remains taxable if he retains certain administrative powers over
the trust corpus and the reversion will occur with fifteen years. Id., § 2922(a) -21 (c) (2).
19. 202 F.2d 94 (7th Cir. 1953). The opinion involves two cases dealing with identical
trusts set up by two sisters. Both the Tax Court and the Court of Appeals considered thj
cases together. For simplicity, reference to the taxpayers in this Note is in the singular.
20. Id. at 95. The powers of the charity as trustee were limited only in that the
corpus upon reversion wras to contain stock equivalent to that transferred. Ibid.
21. Ibid. The taxpayer also set up another trust, with a ten-year term, in 1943. Id.
at 96.
22. Taxpayer Clark returned a net taxable income of $13,585.83 for 1946; Ruther-
ford, $14,903.92. The trusts set up by each taxpayer earned $42,750.00. Id. at 9b. Indi-
viduals, at that time, could deduct charitable contributions only up to 15% of their adjusted
gross income. INT. REV. CODE § 23(o). See amendments effective through 1944 in P-H
CuMs. CH. SERV. PP. 14-A - 14-C.
23. Commissioner v. Clark, 202 F.2d 94, 96 (7th Cir. 1953). Taxability of trust
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Clifford doctrine nor the regulation was applicable to charitable trusts.2 1
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit passed over the charitable nature of the trust
to give its wholesale endorsement to every objection raised by the taxpayer."3
The court agreed that the regulation could not be applied "retroactively" to
a trust already in existence and, further, that the trust term was not nine but
ten years.26 But what was "[miore important" in the eyes of the court, the
regulation "creates a conclusive or irrebutable presumption" "that even Con-
gress [is] without power to create" because it violates due process.2 7 Further-
more, under Section 22 (a), "the question as to whether the income from the
trust was that of [the settlor] was one of fact" requiring a judicial hearing in
each case.28 Finally, the case law did not, according to the court, support
taxation of the settlor on the facts of this case.
29
Precedent does not support the court's cursory acceptance of the taxpayer's
contention based on the "retroactive" application of the regulation. The court
disposes of "retroactivity" with two sentences: the regulation cannot be applied
to trusts in existence prior to its promulgation; and it cannot create taxable
income where there was none previously.30 Underlying both assertions is an
assumption that the settlor would not have been taxable prior to the regulation.
Even if the court could conclusively support this proposition,3 1 a person has
income for years prior to January 1, 1946 is to be determined without reference to the
Clifford regulations. U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22(a)-21(f) (1945).
It is not clear why the Commissioner abandoned his claim for 1944 and 1945. He
may have thought that the generally pro-taxpayer Seventh Circuit would decide that the
case law did not support taxation for 1944 and 1945, and that such a decision would in
turn undermine his chances for success under the regulation. Whereas, were the court
to consider the regulation alone, attention would presumably be focused on its reason-
ableness rather than on how the court itself would have decided the case in the absence
of any regulation.
24. Ruth S. Clark, Hazel S. Rutherford, 17 T.C. 1357 (1952). Three judges dis-
sented. The majority chose its precedents judiciously, citing Bok, Pierce, Chaniberlain,
and Achelis to support its result, distinguishing Lamont on its facts, and ignoring
Anderso, the Lamont dictum, and its own decision in May (a more recent case than
the precedent it cites here). Above cases cited, supra note 15. See also note 74 infra.
25. Commissioner v. Clark, 202 F.2d 94, 98 (7th Cir. 1953).
26. Ibid.
27. Id. at 98, 99, 100.
28. Id. at 98.
29. "The regulation is in conflict with . . . all adjudicated cases." Id. at 99.
30. Id. at 98.
31. By adept choice of precedent, a court can support almost any desired result
in this field. For an example, see the Tax Court majority opinion in Clark, 17 T.C. 1357
(1952), discussed, note 24 supra. The jumble of cases is outlined in notes 11-15 supra,
In any event, the decisions provide no justification for the Seventh Circuit's unsupported
assertion that "[tihe regulation is in conflict with . . . all adjudicated cases." Com-
missioner v. Clark, 202 F.2d 94, 99 (7th Cir. 1953). Further, it seems that the decisions




no vested right of non-taxability.32 The Supreme Court has held that even a
prior adjudication holding an assignor non-taxable on assigned income does
not preclude taxing him on later income under the same assignmentp
In addition, the Seventh Circuit's "thought" that the Clark trust ran for
ten years, and therefore fell outside the regulation, contravenes both practice
and policy. The regulation and the court decisions measure the term for tax
purposes from the date of extension, not from that of the original trust deed.3 4
Thus the Tax Court viewed the Clark trust as running for nine years.35 And,
in fact, the settlor had at no time surrendered control for more than nine
years. Under the Seventh Circuit's theory, a settlor who surrenders his power
of disposition for only short periods of time could eventually gain tax ex-
emption through successive extensions of the trust term. 0
Although the court's facile disposition of these two issues turns out to be
legerdemain, it could provide other judges with convenient grounds for dis-
tinguishing Clark. But in view of the abbreviated treatment accorded these
contentions, there can be little doubt that the real basis for the Seventh Cir-
cuit's decision lies elsewhere.37
The court erred in holding that even Congress would deny due process by
erecting the conclusive presumption which the Treasury created in the "short-
term" regulation. As a practical matter, this view invites a renascence of
litigation at least until there remain no untried variations on the short-term
trust.3 8 The history of the Clifford doctrine indicates not only that the possible
32. Reinecke v. Smith, 289 U.S. 172 (1933). "[T]he subject of the tax is not the
creation of trusts or transfer of the corpus from the grantor to the trustees, but the
income of the trusts which accrued after. . . the effective date of the Revenue Act. ..
Id. at 175. Also, see Burnet v. Wells, 670, 6S2-3 (1933).
33. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948). The Court reached this result
on the ground that its intervening decisions had changed the "legal climate." Id. at
606-07. While a regulation promulgated to clarify muddied case law may not have the
force of Supreme Court decisions, it does seem to affect the "legal climate."
34. U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22(a)-21(c) (1945). See Commissioner v. Lamont,
127 F2d 875 (2d Cir. 1942); Commissioner v. Barbour, 122 F2d 165 (2d Cir.), cerl.
denied, 314 U.S. 691 (1941).
35. "The question ... is whether the settlor-petitioners should be taxed .. . solely
because the duration of the trust is 9 instead of 10 years. .. ." Ruth S. Clark, 17 T.C.
1357, 1361 (1952).
36. For example, the settlor of a five-year trust who, at the expiration of the trust,
extended the term for another five years would not be taxed on the trust income for
the second five years under the Clark rationale. And, apparently, any later extensions,
however short, would not lead to taxability.
37. Having devoted a sum total of three sentences to "retroactivity" and the length
of the trust term, the court turns to an extensive discussion of issues it labels "[r]ore
important." Commissioner v. Clark, 202 F2d 94, 98 (7th Cir. 1953). The former rulings
appear to be the thirteenth bun in the baker's dozen the Seventh Circuit insisted on
giving the taxpayer.
38. Subsequent to the promulgation of the Clifford regulations, litigation in the field
declined markedly, while hundreds of cases had flooded the courts in the five years after
Clifford. Although the regulations were expressly made inapplicable to prior years, see
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variations are infinite but also that, in this area, case by case determinations
do not produce inescapable rules of law.3 9 Fortunately, the Constitution does
not command ad hoc decisions; conclusive presumptions are valid if reason-
able. 40 Two of the decisions cited by Clark struck down presumptions that
all gifts within a certain period prior to death were made in contemplation
thereof. 41 There a state of mind was inferred from the subsequent occurrence
of an unpredictable event ;42 the regulation challenged here bases "ownership"
on the terms of the trust deed. The Hoeper case, Clark's third "controlling
precedent," declared unconstitutional a state statute taxing husbands on their
wives' income.43 There the question was whether someone else's earnings
could be merged with the taxpayer's; here it is whether he has in reality parted
with the trust corpus. 44 The Supreme Court distinguished Hoeper on this
very ground in upholding taxation of settlors on the income of revocable
trusts. 45 Thus Clark ignored the closest possible precedent, to invalidate the
regulation on the basis of earlier, clearly distinguishable decisions. Moreover,
the high Court had on more than one occasion invited Congress and the
Treasury to clean up the Clifford mess.40 Since it is clear that a "conclusive
note 23 supra, many taxpayers who might otherwise have contested deficiency assess-
ments apparently did not.
39. "[I]f [the Clifford doctrine] is to be continually refined by successive distinc-
tions, each trifling in itself, we shall end in a morass from which there will be no escape;
and the spate of decisions already poured upon us will be the earnest of eventual titter
confusion. Perhaps it is best not to approach the issue dialectically at all, but merely
by fiat. . . ." L. Hand, J., in Kohnstamm v. Pedrick, 153 F.2d 506, 510 (2d Cir. 1945).
For illustrations of the inconsistency among decisions, see notes 11-15 supra.
40. "The question is whether [the standard] is one that an enlightened legislator
might act upon without affront to justice. Even administrative convenience, the practical
necessities of an efficient system of taxation, will have heed and recognition within
reasonable limits .... A margin must be allowed for the play of legislative judgment. To
overcome this [enactment] the taxpayers must show that ...the lawmakers have done
a wholly arbitrary thing, have found equivalence where there was none nor anything
approaching it, and laid a burden unrelated to privilege or benefit." Burnet v. Wells, 289
U.S. 670, 678-9 (1933). See also Reinecke v. Smith, 289 U.S. 172, 178 (1933).
41. Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932) ; Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230
(1926).
42. "The young man in abounding health, bereft of life by a stroke of lightning with-
in two years after making a gift, is conclusively presumed to have acted under the induce-
ment of the thought of death. . . ." Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 327 (1932).
43. Hoeper v. Tax Commission of Wisconsin, 284 U.S. 206 (1931).
44. See Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940). See note 56 infra.
45. Reinecke v. Smith, 289 U.S. 172, 178 (1933). CI. Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670,
677-9 (1933).
46. See Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579, 583 (1941) ; Helvering v. Clifford, 309
U.S. 331, 334-5, 338 (1940). See also Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154, 167 (1942).
Since Congress has the power "to carve out of .§ 22(a) a defined group of cases [like
revocable trusts under § 166] to which a rule of thumb [will] be applied," Helvering v.
Clifford, supra at 337-8, it seems clear that that prerogative can be delegated to the
Treasury. Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 26 (1916). And such power has
been delegated. See note 48 infra.
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presumption" based on the terms of the trust instrument can be constitution-
ally created, the "short-term" regulation is void only if it is unreasonable or
fails to conform with the pertinent statute.47
Clark also strayed in holding that, under Section 22(a), a hearing is neces-
sary in each case to determine whether a settlor is the owner of the trust
income for tax purposes. Since there is no explicit statutory provision to that
effect,48 the court sought precedent in the case law. Misapplying Horuwl v.
Helvering 4 9 to gain support, Clark quoted Clifford as saying that a hearing
on the facts is required.5° But the Seventh Circuit failed to note that the
"absence of more precise standards or guides supplied by statute or appropriate
regulations" forced the Supreme Court to scrutinize "'all the circumstances"
in Clifford.51 And the Court reiterated this plea for a nonjudicial statement
of the Clifford doctrine two weeks after it decided Hormcl.2
In the last analysis, the validity of the "short-tern" regulation must turn
on the question Clark treated so cavalierly-whether a trust term of less than
ten years in itself provides a reasonable ground for taxing a settlor on trust
income. This standard must be reasonable in the constitutional sense and also
as a construction of Section 22(a) as interpreted by the cuurtsP3a Although
47. See, e.g., Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 49, 501 (1943).
Also, see Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 303 U.S. 39, 52 (1939); Manhattan General
Equipment Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936). Insofar as nt incunsistent
with express statutory provisions, regulations have the force and effect of lawv. Mary-
land Casualty Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 342, 349 (1920). See, generally, Eisenstein,
Some Iconwclastic Reflcctions on Tax Administration, 58 HArm. L. RPZ. 477, 50,947
(1945); Griswold, A Summary of the Regulations Problem, 54 HAnuv. L. Rwv. 393 (1941).
48. In fact, the power to promulgate regulations for all sections of the Code has been
delegated without reservation. INT. REv. Comn §§ 61, 62, Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R.,
240 U.S. 1, 26 (1916).
49. 312 U.S. 552 (1941). There the Commissioner had argued §§ 16 and 167
before the Board of Tax Appeals. While an appeal was pending from the Board's
decision, the Supreme Court decided Clifford. Thereupon the Commissioner in the court
of appeals switched to § 22(a) via the Clifford doctrine and won. "Under these cir-
cumstances" the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Board to enable the taxpayer
to present any additional facts which might "take his case out of the Clifford rule." Id.
at 560. In view of its context-the absence of any applicable regulatiun and the collector's
introduction of a new theory on appeal-Horncl hardly seems controlling here.
50. Commissioner v. Clark, 202 F.2d 94, 99 (7th Cir. 1953).
51. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334-5 (1940) (emphasis added).
52. See Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579, 583 (1941). See also Helvering v.
Stuart, 317 U.S. 154, 167 (1942) and note 48 supra.
53. Granting that the Treasury can constitutionally promulgate a regulation inferring
"ownership" from the terms of the trust instrument, see notes 45-7 supra, the question
remains whether the particular regulation created meets the constitutional standard of
reasonableness. Under the statute, the question is whether the regulation reasonably
effectuates the congressional intent. See note 47 supra and accompanying text. And
since "[t]he broad sweep of [the] language [of section 22(a)] indicates the purpose oi
Congress to use the full measure of its taxing power," Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S.
331, 334 (1940), the question of reasonableness is, for all practical purposes, the same
under the Constitution and under Section 22(a).
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admitting the existence of "some confusion" in the field, the Seventh Circuit
found it unnecessary to analyze the case law because the decisions "all in the
main employ [all] the factors enumerated in Clifford."' 4 In fact, the Com-
missioner "concede[d] that his determination of the deficiencies [for the pre-
regulation years] was erroneous." Thus Clark's holding that the regulation
was unreasonable as applied rests merely on the court's abrupt dismissal of
previous decisions and on the Commissioner's perhaps mistaken concession
regarding tax years prior to the regulation.
Actually, it seems quite reasonable to tax settlors on trust income solely
because the corpus will revert within ten years. The basic question, as posed
by Clifford and subsequent Supreme Court decisions, is whether the settlor
has in economic reality parted with the corpus.5 When the term is short, it
is doubtful that control has in fact been relinquishedY7 The trustee is under
a duty to the settlor as reversioner to preserve the corpus ;s and few trustees
would not manage the property according to reasonable suggestions from a
settlor soon to reacquire possession." Moreover, the creator of a short-term
irrevocable trust seldom effects any change in his economic status or relation-
ships.60 Rather he intends simply to save taxes while disposing of his income
54. Commissioner v. Clark, 202 F.2d 94, 97 (7th Cir. 1953). The cases do not support
this sweeping generalization. See notes 11-15 supra.
55. Commissioner v. Clark, 202 F.2d 94, 97 (7th Cir. 1953). See note 23 supra.
56. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940). The high Court starts with
the basic premise that the revenue laws are not to be avoided by "legal niceties" of
property law. In order to embrace as many as possible of the infinite number of income-
splitting devices, the Court has sketched its theory in broad outline, going far beyond
what was necessary to decide most of the cases before it. A grantor remains taxable
when he continues to exercise control over income-producing property or the income there-
from. Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154 (1942); Helvering v. Clifford, supra. And
even though his control may be suspended, a donor who derives economic benefits, even
"non-material satisfactions," from the returns on income-producing property remains
taxable on that income unless he has for all practical purposes parted with the property
forever. Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579 (1941) ; Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112
(1940) ; Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940). See generally, Pavenstedt, The
Broadened Scope of Section 22(a): The Evolution of the Clifford Doctrhie, 51 YALF L.J.
213 (1941) ; Note, 10 U. oF CHi L. REv. 488 (1943).
57. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
58. 2 ScoTT, TRusTs §§ 232-41 (1939).
59. See Helvering v. Bok, 132 F.2d 365, 366-7 (3d Cir. 1942); Commissioner v.
Lamont, 127 F.2d 875, 876 (2d Cir. 1942) ; Mctlnight v. Commissioner, 123 F.2d 240, 242
(8th Cir. 1941); Helvering v. Elias, 122 F.2d 171, 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S.
692 (1941).
60. See Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 335-6 (1940); cases cited, supra note
59. Examination of the facts in Clark leads to a like conclusion. Apparently, securities
comprised the principal, if not the sole, source of the taxpayer's independent income. The
trust in dispute was set up on the eve of United States entry into World War II. By
virtue of increased dividends with the end of the depression and the beginning of the
mobilization effort, the securities probably provided, and would for some time continue
to provide, more income than the taxpayer desired in order to maintain her standard of
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to the same beneficiaries who enjoyed it before.0' He would not, of course,
remain taxable if he parted with the corpus forever or postponed the reversion
for a considerable period.0 2 But he desires the opportunity to recapture the
corpus within a few years because he may then need the income himself or
have changed his mind as to suitable objects for his beneficence.z Further-
more, should the settlor retain a power to revoke after a term of years instead
of a reversion, he would be taxable under a specific provision of the Code. 4
It is unreasonable to allow the taxpayer to circumvent the policy of that pro-
vision merely by juggling technical concepts of property law. True, drawing
the line at ten years, as the Treasury did, is arbitrary-in the same sense that
any dividing line is arbitrary. But the economic factors discussed above appear
to support taxation of trust income to settlors to whom the corpus will revert
within ten years.65
living. Taxes had also increased and could be expected to remain high for several
years. Under these circumstances, and presumably to "save" taxes, the taxpayer was
willing to commit part of her income to a charitable cause, managed by relatives, to which
it would probably have gone anyway. But since either dividends or taxes, or both,
could also be expected to decrease at some time in the future, the taxpayer retained a
reversion in anticipation of a time when changed conditions might cause her to
reconsider.
61. See Commissioner v. Lamont, 127 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1942); Leonard Farlas,
8 T.C. 1351, 1357 (1947), rev'd, 170 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1948). See Farkas v. Commis-
sioner, 170 F.2d 201, 205 (5th Cir. 1948) ; United States v. Pierce, 137 F.2d 428, 433 (Sth
Cir. 1943) (dissenting opinions).
Even if the taxpayer does shunt his income in new directions, as appears to be the
case in Clark, there is still no justification for permitting him to escape the full impact
of the income tax. The choice of the short-term trust as the mechanism of transfer in
itself suggests the intent to avoid taxes. See Kennedy, Short-Term Trusts Today, 30
T.Am. 1006 (1952). And the taxpayer still retains the reversionary string, permitting
him to retrieve the corpus before too much time has passed.
62. E.g., Cushman v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1946); Jones v. Norris,
122 F2d 6 (10th Cir. 1941); Commissioner v. Branch, 114 F.2d 985 (1st Cir. 1940).
But where extensive controls have been retained by the settlor, many courts taxed him
on that factor alone when there was no possibility, except subject to extensive contingencies,
that the property would ever revert E.g., Littel v. Commissioner, 154 F.2d 922 (2d Cir.
1946); Byerly v. Commissioner, 154 F.2d 879 (6th Cir.), ecrt. denied, 329 U.S. 727
(1946); Foerderer v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 53 (3d Cir. 1944).
63. See note 60 supra.
64. hIT. REv. CoDE § 166. See note 3 supra and accompanying text. Even there a
settlor who has a "vested" power of revocation but can exercise it only after a long
term of years would presumably be held non-taxable. Sce Helvering v. Dunning, 118 F.2d
341, 345 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 631 (1941). But no decision has as yet found
a term long enough.
65. It would appear that the Clifford regulations have the tacit approval of Congress.
"Treasury regulations and interpretations long continued without sub.tantial change,
applying to unamended or substantially re-enacted statutes, are deemed to have received
congressional approval and have the effect of law." Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79,
83 (1938). In recent years, Congress has been quick to act when distressed by non-
congressional developments in this area of tax law. E.g., I.;T. REv. CoDe § 107kc) over-
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The fact that the beneficiary falls outside the settlor's "intimate family
group" should not preclude taxation. Many lower courts thought that the
Clifford doctrine was so limited. But the Supreme Court had merely stated
that -this circumstance called for "special scrutiny of the arrangement. "0 7 If
taxability were to turn on where trust income goes, the logical line of demarca-
tion would lie between discharge of legal obligations and other uses. But tax
liability is thus limited only when the discharge of a legal obligation is the
sole ground for taxation.68 Granting that a settlor may remain taxable on
income of a gratuitous irrevocable trust, his liability should not depend on
the identity of the beneficiaries. Congress made no distinction between intra-
and extra-family dispositions in taxing the income of revocable trusts to
settlors. 69 And the Supreme Court, in a similar situation, could see no differ-
ence between a campaign or community chest contribution and a gift to the tax-
payer's son.70 If the settlor's purpose "can be [achieved] only by the ex-
penditure of money or property," the identity of the beneficiary provides no
rational basis for a tax distinction between settlors of otherwise identical
trusts.7 '
The fact that the beneficiary of a short-term trust is a charity should pro-
vide the settlor with no income tax saving beyond the allowable deduction
for charitable contributions. The Tax Court in Clark, however, held that
neither the regulation nor the Clifford doctrine was applicable to charitable
trusts.7 2 Since the Treasury explicitly excluded charitable trusts from other
sections of the Clifford regulations,7 3 the lack of similar language in the ten-
year provision indicates that no exemption was intended there. Nor do the
decisions cited by the Tax Court provide sound authority for such a result.7 4
ruled Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154 (1942); 'INT. Rav. CODE §§ 191, 3797(a) (2)
changed the rule of Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949). It can scarcely
be contended that Congress is unaware of the existence of the Clifford regulations.
66. See note 13 supra.
67. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 335 (1940) (emphasis added).
68. INT. Rav. CODE § 167(c). See Guterman, The Federal Income Tax and Trutss
for Support-The Stuart Case and Its Aftermath, 57 HARv. L. Ray. 479 (1944).
69. INT. Rav. CODE § 166, discussed supra note 3. See Elsie A. Drexler, 25 B.T.A. 79
(1932), appeal dismisssed, 65 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1933) (charitable beneficiaries).
70. See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 117 (1940) (assigned income).
71. Ibid. See United States v. Anderson, 132 F.2d 98, 101 (6th Cir. 1941), cerl.
denied, 318 U.S. 790 (1943).
72. Ruth S. Clark, 17 T.C. 1357 (1952).
73. U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, §§ 29.22(a)-21(c)(2), 29.22(a)-21(d)(2) (1945).
74. Helvering v. Bok, 132 F.2d 365 (3d Cir. 1942), relies heavily on the family circle
rationale. Id. at 367. But see notes 67-71 supra and accompanying text. In United
States v. Pierce, 137 F.2d 428 (8th Cir. 1943), the fact that the term was ten years, which
would take it outside the present regulation, was regarded as significant. Id. at 432. Both
Commissioner v. Chamberlain, 121 F.2d 765 (2d Cir. 1941) and Helvering v. Achelis,
112 F.2d 929, 929-30 (2d Cir. 1940), which distinguished charitable trusts, have been
specifically questioned by the court that decided them. Commissioner v. Lamont, 127 F.2d
875, 876 (2d Cir. 1942). Moreover, the statements in Achelis are dicta.
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Furthermore, the Code accords individuals and corporations who make out-
right gifts to charity only limited deductions for income tax purposes. 75 De-
cisions like that of the Tax Court in Clark permit the settlor of a temporary
trust to escape that restriction. Should Congress desire to exempt taxpayers
to the full extent of their charitable donations, it could allow an unlimited
income tax deduction." Absent such legislative action, courts should not
fabricate an exemption benefiting only those wealthy enough to fund short-
term trusts.
75. Individuals may deduct charitable contributions up to 20', of adjusted gross in-
come, Ix'r. Rev. CoDm § 23(o); corporations, up to 5% of net income, Iz:r. R=. Coz
§ 23(q).
But the Code treats differently situations where charity alone, and not the donor as
well, benefits. Thus genuine charitable trusts and foundations are tax exempt. I.r.
REV. CoDE § 101. And the gift 'tax does not apply to charitable donations. I;T. Re,.
CoDE § 1004(a) (2).
See, generally, Clark, How To Get the Most Out of the Deduction for Charitatd Con-
tributions by Indiziduals and Business, Paocmm~x.as or N.Y.U. 6TH A::.. I:.sn rvTr
oN FEDmRAL TAjXAtTioN 1015 (1948) ; Lynch, Tie 'Charities' Prozisions of the Intcrnal
Revenezi Code, 10 FoRn. L. REv. 234 (1941); Note, 34 VAt. L. Rev. 1S2 (1943).
76. See Abbell, Human Nature, Charitable Contributions and Uncle Sam, 23 TA :xEs
243 (1950).
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